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Abstract
The essay examines the ancient Greek origin of philosophy relative to the concept of wisdom. The nature of the sage is first 
considered. The sage is one who is deemed wise in his or her performances. But what is ‘wise’ about such performances? The 
Socratic denial of sage status is considered in reference to this. Socrates concludes that he is not wise as the gods are wise, but 
that he is wise insofar as he knows that he is not wise. The apparent contradiction is resolved through the distinction between 
human (finite) and divine (infinite) wisdom. The latter notion is further examined in the works of Aristotle who articulates 
the “classical paradigm” of philosophy in pursuit of infinite wisdom. The attributes of infinite wisdom are identified, and the 
essay concludes with a discussion of the sagely performance of infinite wisdom, Aristotle himself serving as the representative 
example. 
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The Sage as Wise Performer
Anyone familiar with Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the 
Eminent Philosophers will no doubt recall the many timeless 
stories that he tells of the Greek philosophers of ancient 
times. We hear of Diogenes (the Cynic) who lived and slept 
in a wine jar (pithos), his natural way of life inspiring the awe 
of even Alexander the Great.1 There is also Zeno of Citium, 
who following a shipwreck in which he is said to have lost his 
personal fortune, thereafter entered a bookstore and read 
a copy of Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Inspired by the account 
of the life of Socrates, he inquired of the bookseller whether 
anyone in Athens was like this philosopher. It so happened 
that Crates was passing by, and the bookseller pointed to 
him.2 With that, Stoicism was born. 
1 DL, 6.2.31. Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, transl. R.D. 
Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
2 DL, 7.1.2. 
Many other memorable stories are recorded in this 
work of which I could speak, but it is not the point of this 
essay to examine such stories here. Instead, I should like to 
focus on one particular story, found at the very beginning of 
Diogenes’ account. There, the reader will find what amounts 
to the most remarkable claim of all. In response to purported 
theories regarding the origin of philosophy (likely floating 
around during his time), Diogenes states the following: 
These authors forget that the achievements which 
they attribute to the barbarians belong to the 
Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy but the 
human race itself began.3
Taken from a contemporary perspective, where 
examples of philosophy can be seen blossoming among the 
ancient cultures spanning the Americas, Northern Africa, and 
the larger Eurasian continent, such a view must no doubt be 
3 DL, 1.prol.3.
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taken as an instance of cultural bias. Certainly human beings 
from all cultures and times will have raised philosophical 
questions about the purpose of life and meaning of existence. 
Of course, at a very early stage, such practitioners would 
not have been called philosophers. Among the Greeks, they 
were instead called ‘wise ones’ or ‘sages’ (sophoi). Similar 
notions are found among other ancient cultures, such as 
the Chinese shengren,4 the Hindu rishi,5 the Egyptian rekh,6 
the Akkadian apkallu,7 and so on. The reputed number of 
the (most renowned) sages has also been of some historical 
significance, as it tends to be seven. Plato, for example, lists 
seven sages in the Protagoras, including Thales, Pittacus, 
Bias, Solon, Cleobulus, Mison, Chilo.8 Diogenes cites a slightly 
different list.9 Seven sages are also cited among other ancient 
traditions.
But who are the sages? Still more, what is a sage? For an 
answer to these questions, we might turn again to the account 
given by Diogenes Laertius. Take Thales for example. He is 
described as an astronomer,10 as being the “first to maintain 
the immortality of the soul”,11 as providing “excellent advice 
on political matters”,12 as holding that “water is the universal 
primary substance”,13 and so on.14 For another example, 
Solon is noted both for his wise utterances and, in particular, 
political sagacity. He provided the Athenians with laws,15 aided 
the city in its war against Megara,16 and in an act emblematic 
of Plato’s philosopher-king, refused an offer to rule as tyrant 
of that city.17 Wise sayings are also attributed to him, such as 
4 Rina Maria Camus (2013) The Wiseman and the Sage: Metaphysics as 
Wisdom in Aristotle and the Neo-Confucian Scholl of Principle. Frontiers of 
Philosophy in China 8(1): 121.
5 Mahatma Gandhi, The Essence of Hinduism (Ahmedabad: Nevajivan 
Publishing House, 1987), p. xiii.
6 Théophile Obenga, Egypt: Ancient History of African Philosophy. in 
A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. by Kwasi Wiredu (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), p. 33.
7 Erica Reiner, The Etiological Myth of the Seven Sages. Orientalia, 30:1 
(1961): 1.
8 Plato, Protagoras, 343ab. All translations for Plato’s texts are based upon 
John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
9 DL, 1.1.13. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the ancient 
identification of the sages, see Alden Mosshammer, The Epoch of the Seven 





14 For a more complete account, see D. R. Dicks, “Thales,” The Classical 
Quarterly 9:2 (1959), 294-309.
15 D.L., 1.3.45 & 1.3.61.
16 D.L., 1.3.46.
17 D.L., 1.3.49.
“Speech is the mirror of action”.18 Of Chilon, Diogenes notes 
that he offered marital advice, wrote songs, and interestingly, 
that “He was a man of few words (brachylogos)”.19
Although interesting, it may be objected that the account 
of the sages given by Diogenes is of mere dilettantes who, 
akin to Hippias of Elis, wove their own garments.20 Further 
inspection, however, reveals an underlying unity. Classicist 
Richard P. Martin, for example, argues that the various 
descriptions of the sages seen in Diogenes and other 
historical accounts can in fact be classified under three 
distinct headings, viz., that of poet, political servant, and 
performer.21 The third notion is in fact the most significant. 
The sages are performers who enact wise accomplishments 
both in word (wise utterances, proverbs) and in deed 
(miraculous feats, clever demonstrations, etc.).22 Their role 
as renowned performers is likewise intertwined with the 
kinds of social actors that they engage with. For this reason, 
the sages are often seen in the literature interacting with 
kings, emperors, and other persons of high social-standing.23 
In Herodotus, for example, Chilon advises the Athenian 
tyrant Peisistratos, following an omen, to avoid rearing a son 
of his own.24 Alternatively, the wise counsel of Solon to King 
Croesus became the very words that would later save the 
King from the funeral pyre following defeat at the hands of 
the Persian Emperor Cyrus.25
Although Martin’s classification is no doubt justified by 
ample textual evidence, a difficulty yet remains. The sages 
are poets, political servants, and principally, performers. At 
the same time, however, it cannot be said that such attributes 
differentiate the sage as performers from other types of 
performers, such as lyrical poets, orators, despots, not to 
mention sophists. What then distinguishes the performance 
of the sage qua sage? 
To answer this, we might consider first the nature 
18 D.L., 1.3.58.
19 D.L., 1.4.72.
20 Cf., Plato, Hippias Major, 282d6-e8.
21 Richard Martin, “The Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom,” in Cultural 
Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics, ed. by Carol Dougherty 
& Leslie Kurke (Oxford University Press, 1998): 112. See also, Richard 
Martin, “Seven Sages,” in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, ed. by Roger 
S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine, & Sabine 
R. Huebner (John Wiley & Sons, 2017). DOI: 10.1002/9781444338386.
wbeah30425
22 Martin, The Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom. p. 117.
23 Martin, The Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom. p. 116.
24 Herodotus, Histories, 1.59. See also Richmond Lattimore, “The Wise 
Adviser in Herodotus,” Classical Philology 34:1(1939), 24-35. In particular, 
Lattimore identifies (pp. 24-25) two kinds of advisors within ancient 
thought, viz., the tragic warner and the practical adviser or counselor.
25 Herodotus, Histories, 1.29-32 & 1.86.
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of a performance itself. A performance is a type of social 
interaction between (a) one who performs and (b) one who 
views the performance. In matters of social evaluation, it is 
generally those who view the performance, in the sense of 
the spectator and audience, who provide an evaluation (i.e., 
right or wrong) of the quality of what has been performed. 
If we furthermore take the predicate ‘wise’ as constituting 
a value predicate that arises within a social context (akin to 
‘good’, ‘right’, ‘pleasing’, ‘attractive’, and so on), then it follows 
that it is precisely the spectators and audience who judge 
that the performance is wise, so that the performer is in turn 
evaluated as wise. In such evaluations, the type of spectator 
is no less relevant, as Martin suggests. That a friend or family 
member should seek one’s advice is a different matter than 
that a renowned politician, king, or emperor should do so. In 
this, we see why the social status of the spectator is relevant 
to the historical account of the sages. The advice of the sage 
is regal advice. But regal advice is a potential indication of 
wise advice, since it deals with the highest matters pertinent 
to civil society and the just (or unjust) exercise of power. 
One who bestows regal advice, especially where such 
advice proves fruitful, will in general be identified as a wise 
counselor.
From the above it follows that the sage is not just a 
wise performer, but in particular one whose performance is 
deemed wise. The problem, however, is that the definition is 
circular. The wise performance is deemed wise. But precisely 
what is wise about such performances? 
To answer this question, I return to Diogenes and 
consider precisely the mishmash of skills that he associates 
with the sages. For example, in the ancient world, Thales was 
renowned for having predicted an eclipse that brought to 
a halt a battle between the Medes and the Lydians on May 
28, 585 BCE.26 Taken in isolation, the accomplishment is no 
doubt astounding, particularly during this early stage. But it 
is not the only accomplishment that Diogenes lists of Thales. 
To the contrary, Thales is also described as an accomplished 
metaphysician, politician, poet, and so on. Here Martin’s three 
attributes come to the fore. The accomplishments of Thales 
were remarkable, but also manifold in character. Similar 
points may be made for the other sages. Far from being 
mere dilettantes, the sages are more accurately described as 
polymaths and Renaissance types whose accomplishments 
are remarkable and excellent (virtuous) in character. An 
analogy may be drawn to the ancient heroes of Greek 
mythology, as Odysseus, who is described by Homer as a man 
of manifold skill (polymetis) and divers ways (polytropos).27 
So too the sagely exhibition of wisdom is manifold and 
26 Herodotus, Histories, 1.73-74.
27 Homer, Iliad, 21:355; Odyssey, 1:1.
diverse according to its kind.
There is, however, a further and perhaps overlooked 
attribute of the sage. This is seen in the consistent emphasis 
upon their use of wise sayings, aphorisms, and similar forms 
of brief utterances. We see this both in Diogenes Laertius 
(as above noted) as well as in Plato’s account of the sages 
in the Protagoras. There Socrates complains that the great 
sophist’s speeches are simply too lengthy to remember.28 
This complaint is followed up by a short encomium on 
the virtue of the Lacaedamonians, and in particular, their 
utterances, which are noted for laconic brevity (brachylogia 
tis Lakonike).29 But why the emphasis here? Why should Plato 
(through the mouth of Socrates) direct the reader’s attention 
to such a seemingly insignificant matter?
I note that the scholarly literature surrounding this 
issue is generally undecided, some holding that Socrates 
is speaking ironically, opposing such maxims to the long-
winded speeches of Protagoras. Others take a different 
direction.30 Suspending judgment on the particulars of 
the debate, I focus instead on the relevance of the laconic 
utterance itself. Following historical testimonies, some 
147 maxims were purportedly inscribed on the Temple at 
Delphi.31 These maxims (some of which Plato cites) ranged 
from the well-known “know thyself” (gnothi seauton) to 
“nothing in excess” (meden agan), as well as other maxims 
such as “consult the wise” (sophois chro) and “seek wisdom” 
(philosophos ginou). Although the historical origin of these 
maxims is generally unknown, later sources, including 
Diognes Laertius, attribute the sayings to the seven sages.32 
The reference does not, however, appear altogether amiss, 
as Plato too links the maxims to the sages, noting that they, 
“dedicated these as the first-fruits of their lore to Apollo in 
his Delphic temple.”33
Regardless of their specific origin, that such maxims 
should be attributed to the sages, is doubtless significant. 
The above sayings (as well as the other reputed examples) 
may in general be classified as moral maxims, which is to say, 
short, pithy sayings that serve as general rules of conduct.34 
28 Plato, Protagoras, 334cd.
29 Plato, Protagoras, 343b20.
30 For a summary of the larger discussion, see Christopher Moore, 
“Spartan Philosophy and Sage Wisdom in Plato’s Protagoras,” Epoché, 20:2 
(2016), 281-305. Delfim F. Leão, “The Seven Sages and Plato,” Il quinto 
secolo. Studi etc. Passignano s (2010), 403-414.
31 For the list of the maxims, see Stobaeus, Anth., 3.1.173.
32 DL, 9.11.71
33 Plato, Protagoras, 343ab.
34 For a classification of the types of maxims or proverbs that occur in 
early Greek thought, see Emanuele Lelle, Toward a Classification of Greek 
Proverbs. Paremia 16 (2007), 139-148.  
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Such maxims function as ethical imperatives: Do this. Don’t 
do that.35 This highlights the fact that they are not to be 
taken as items of dispute, but rather as moral directives 
to be reflected upon and put into practice. When seen in 
the context of Socrates’ distaste for long speeches and his 
remarks regarding his own tendency toward forgetfulness, 
the laconic utterance inevitably leads us back to Plato’s theory 
of recollection (anamnesis).36 Simply stated, as the discussion 
of this theory lies beyond this essay, the key connection can 
be found in the relationship between the laconic utterance 
and later articulations of first principles (archai) found in 
the works of both Plato (viz., the Ideas) and later Aristotle. 
These views indicate that a fundamental portion of the truth 
is in some sense already known to us. The sages likewise 
exemplify such knowledge by their utterances. For this 
reason, they are called ‘wise’.
Socrates and the Denial of Sage Status
Although certain fundamental features of wisdom may be 
identified in the early accounts of the sages, it is nonetheless 
the case that the account remains incomplete. The question 
of what is wise in such performances had yet, I contend, to 
be reflectively considered. For such a consideration, it was 
necessary that the concept of philosophy should itself be 
articulated. Indeed, one of the fundamental contentions 
of this essay, is that the two concepts, viz., wisdom and 
philosophy, at least in their historical origination, are very 
much correlative concepts. As the one concept developed, so 
too the other.
Reflection upon the Greek origin of the concept of 
philosophy reveals why this is the case. Two particular 
events stand out in the historical literature: First, it was 
apparently Pythagoras who coined the term ‘philosophy’, it 
seems, out of piety. The story is related in Diogenes Laertius 
as well as other sources.37 Pythagoras (6th BCE) is said to 
have preferred the title of ‘lover of wisdom’ (philosophos) to 
the more common epithet ‘wise one’ or ‘sage’ (sophos), for 
the reason that: “no man is wise, but God alone”.38 Second, 
there is the example of Socrates, whose story serves as a kind 
of parallel to that of Pythagoras. These events are related in 
Plato’s Apology. Chaerephon, a loyal friend and follower, is 
reported to have asked the oracle at Delphi if any man were 
wiser than Socrates. Her response, usually ambiguous, was 
35 Or more specifically: One ought to do this. One ought not to do that.
36 See, e.g., Plato’s Meno, 80d, as well as the Phaedo, 72e-78b.
37 Anton-Hermann Chroust suggests that Heracleitus is in fact the earliest 
identifiable source for the use of the concept of philosophy. See, Anton-
Hermann Chroust, “Philosophy: Its Essence and Meaning in the Ancient 
World,” The Philosophical Review 56:1 (1947), p. 25.
38 DL, 1.prol.12.
that “there was no man wiser”.39 The ambiguity of the answer, 
however, would eventually fall upon the ears of Socrates who, 
believing himself to have no certain knowledge, wondered 
at such perplexing news. In the attempt to refute the oracle, 
philosophy at least in concept, may be said to have thereafter 
begun.40
If we accept the veracity of these claims, if only in virtue of 
their historical significance for philosophy, then we discover 
something peculiar. Neither Pythagoras nor Socrates are 
willing to claim the epithet ‘wise’. Given the ambiguity, the 
oracle’s response might be read as the suggestion not that 
no one is wiser than Socrates, inasmuch as he indefatigably 
denies this (and the Pythia would have perhaps been aware 
of this fact), but rather that no one is wise. Taken from this 
perspective, the transitional era may in part be understood in 
terms of the growing awareness, among the Greeks, precisely 
of their ignorance.41
Still, a difficulty remains. The difficulty is that such a 
humble denial is not altogether accurate. To the contrary, a 
case may be made that to some extent, both Pythagoras and 
Socrates were wise, or at least, were deemed wise by the 
local Greek population.42 History likewise attests to this fact. 
Although competing accounts of Socrates were in circulation 
(e.g., Aristophanes’ Clouds), his status as a sage must have 
nonetheless been a present historical phenomenon. In the 
first place, there is the pronouncement of the oracle itself. 
That the oracle should recognize Socrates among all others 
individuals as wisest, points to the fact that his status as 
wise would have already been in high regard at the time of 
the pronouncement.43 There is furthermore the high social 
standing of the oracle, inasmuch as this plays an essential 
part in the already discussed designation of sage-status. 
Kings and emperors consult the oracle, who in turn, claims 
that Socrates is wisest among the Athenians. Of course, 
the pronouncements of the sage are often ambiguous, the 
39 Plato, Apology, 21a.
40 There are in fact competing theories regarding Socrates’ interpretation 
of the oracle’s pronouncement, and the supposed “divine mission” that 
follows from this. See, e.g., Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith, “The 
Origin of Socrates’ Mission,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44:4 (1983), 
657-666. Robert Metcalf, “The Philosophical Rhetoric of Socrates’ Mission,” 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 37:2 (2004), 143-166. Daniel W. Graham, “Socrates’ 
Mission,” BYU Studies Quarterly 55:4 (2016), 141-159.
41 Which often accompanies perplexity and the search for knowledge.
42 Socrates indicates this fact in his defense: “The fact is, men of Athens, 
that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort 
of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human 
wisdom.” (Plato, Apology, 20d)
43 There is some debate regarding the purported date in which these 
events took place. A recent account identifies the year at 426 BCE, which 
would put Socrates at about 44 years old. See, Daniel W. Graham and Justin 
Barney, “On the Date of Chaerephon’s Visit to Delphi,” Phoenix 70:3/4 
(2016), 274-289.
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catastrophic misinterpretation of Croesus serving as but 
one example.44 Yet even if the oracle’s pronouncement was 
intended ambiguously, the public elevation that would 
have resulted from such testimony would have likely been 
sufficient to elevate Socrates to the status of a sage within the 
social consciousness of the Greeks of the time.
The second point is that the very act of denying sage-
status is in many ways indicative of sage-status. We might 
compare such a denial to the sophist who not only accepts 
the label, but also derives profit from it.45 Not only does 
such an act appear arrogant, but it is also impious, as if one 
would equate oneself equal to the gods. In contradistinction, 
a wise person insofar as wise, will deny the label of ‘sage’ for 
the very reason that, as Pythagoras earlier stated, the gods 
alone—or most eminently—are wise.
Still more, the denial of sage status appears as an act 
emblematic of the sages of old. This story, which is very similar 
to the account of Socrates, can again be found in Diogenes 
Laertius. Apparently, a dispute arose among a number of 
Ionian youths regarding a sacrificial tripod discovered by a 
fisherman. Unable to decide what to do with the object, they 
asked the oracle of Delphi, who responded:
Who shall possess the tripod? Thus replies
Apollo: “Whosoever is most wise.”46
Upon hearing this, the youths decided to give the tripod 
to Thales. But Thales refused to accept the gift, and instead 
gave it to Solon, who in turn gave it back to Delphi. In a 
display of both humility and piety, no sage was thus willing 
to accept the gift. 
As a final point, the Socratic denial of sage-status 
exhibits also self-awareness, this being reflective of the well-
known Delphic maxim “know thyself” (gnothi seauton). Self-
knowledge is likewise key to the Socratic denial. Although 
the Delphic oracle pronounces that Socrates is wise, Socrates 
in contrast contends that he is not wise:
When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can 
the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this 
riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or 
great. What can he mean when he says that I am 
the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot 
lie; that would be against his nature. After a long 
44 Herodotus, Histories 1.53.
45 In his defense, Socrates denies that he is a sophist precisely on the basis 
of the fact that he does not own his poverty, “And had I gained anything, 
or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in 
that: but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers 
dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; they have no 
witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth of what I say; my poverty is 
a sufficient witness.” (Plato, Apology, 31bc)
46 DL, 1.28.
consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying 
the question. I reflected that if I could only find a 
man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god 
with a refutation in my hand.47
 
Notice the logical nature of the difficulty here. Take, for 
example, the following two statements:
(1) Socrates is wise.
(2) Socrates is not wise.
The god asserts that Socrates is wisest among the 
Athenians, and the god does not lie (as he himself testifies). 
Hence, (1) must be true. Contrariwise, Socrates asserts 
that he is not wise (viz., I have no wisdom, small or great). 
Assuming then that (2) is also true, a contradiction results. 
This at least seems to be the way in which Socrates reads 
the oracle’s pronouncement. For he states that he sought to 
refute the oracle. But this can only mean that he sees some 
contradiction between what he knows (or believes) about 
himself and what the god deems to be the case. Following 
cross-examination of the renowned citizens of Athens, 
Socrates eventually comes to the conclusion that the god has 
spoken truly. Whereas others profess to know, when in fact 
they do not know, of himself he states that: “I neither know 
nor think that I know.”48
In other words, his knowing that he is not wise 
serves as a sufficient condition for confirming the oracle’s 
pronouncement that he is wise:
1. Anyone who knows that they are not wise, must be wiser 
than another who falsely believes that they are wise.
2. Socrates knows that he is not wise.
3. Therefore, Socrates must be wiser than another who 
falsely believes that they are wise.
4. Therefore, Socrates must be wise.49 
But with this conclusion, we are led straight back to 
our earlier problem. How can Socrates be both wise and 
simultaneously not wise? To resolve this difficulty, we do 
well to consider once again the above statements (1) and (2). 
Socrates is both wise and not wise, which is a contradiction. 
But what if the two predicates (wise) in each sentence are 
not intended in the same way and sense? What if their 
relative sense is instead analogical? From such a perspective, 
Socrates could be both wise (1) and not wise (2), and the 
contradiction would be resolved. 
47 Plato, Apology, 21bc.
48 Plato, Apology, 21d. 
49 The inference from 3 to 4 follows from the fact that being wiser than 
another implies that one must have at least a minimal amount of wisdom. In 
like fashion, if x > y, and if y is 0, then it is false to contend that x is 0. For the 
assertion to be true, x must be some number greater than 0.
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What then is meant by ‘wise’ in each sense? The above 
considerations quickly reveal the answer. Thales and Chilon 
refuse the gift of the tripod. Pythagoras refuses the label 
of ‘wise one’, suggesting that only the gods are wise. For a 
parallel example, in the fragments of Heraclitus we read that, 
“The wisest man is an ape compared to God.”50 In like fashion, 
Socrates contends that: 
For on each occasion those who are present think I 
am wise in the matters in which I confute someone 
else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god 
is really wise and by his oracle means this: “Human 
wisdom is of little or no value.”51
From the above examples, we see that the two predicates 
‘wise’ differ in sense according as they are predicated of 
either the human being or of the gods. Socrates is wise as a 
human being is wise (finite wisdom), but he is not wise as 
the gods are wise (infinite wisdom).52 The contradiction is 
thus resolved.
Still, the story does not end here. The Socratic recognition 
of ignorance, as I see it, represented also a major shift in early 
Greek thought. From the pronouncement of the oracle to the 
subsequent trial and execution of Socrates, philosophy as a 
distinct pursuit originates. The pursuit is likewise articulated 
precisely in relation to the above distinction. Philosophy 
originates in the recognition of human ignorance coupled 
with the pursuit of something more, indeed, something 
divine. Hence, Pythagoras does not end with—I am not 
wise (sophos). To the contrary, the denial is followed by the 
affirmation—I am a lover of wisdom (philosophos). In like 
fashion, Socrates denies that he is wise, and following his 
elenchic efforts, philosophy as the pursuit of infinite wisdom, 
is born. 
Aristotle and the Classical Paradigm
Although the concept of infinite wisdom was long 
implicit in early Greek thought, and although Socrates 
would be instrumental in helping to elucidate the difference 
between finite and infinite wisdom, it is not until Plato, and 
later Aristotle, that the notion would receive more direct and, 
50 See fragment (98, 99) of John Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophers, 3rd 
Edition (London, A&C Black, 1920), p. 103.
51 Apology, 23a.
52 Brickhouse and Smith arrive at a similar conclusion. See, especially 
Chapter 2 of, Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). A competing account can be seen in 
Christopher King, “Wisdom, Moderation, and Elenchus in Plato’s “Apology”,” 
Metaphilosophy 39:3 (2008), 345-362. Other significant accounts can be 
found in, Gerasimos Santas, “The Socratic Paradoxes”, The Philosophical 
Review 73:2 (1964), 147-164; also Chapter 1 of, Gregory Vlastos and Daniel 
W. Graham, Studies in Greek Philosophy, Vol. 2: Socrates, Plato, and their 
Tradition, ed. by Daniel W. Graham (Princeton University Press, 1996). 
as it were, explicit treatment. In the Republic, for example, 
Plato’s concept of the philosopher-king serves in a way as 
the culmination of the ancient ideal of the all-wise and just 
ruler.53
Alternatively, the concept of philosophy as the pursuit 
of a higher, divine-like wisdom, can be seen in the cave 
allegory, where the good (agathon) serves as the pinnacle 
of the prisoner’s ascent.54 Alternatively, in the Symposium, 
an analogy is drawn between Eros, an intermediate being 
(daimon) who is the daughter of poverty (penia) and 
plenty (poros).55 Akin to the philosopher as one who seeks 
that which transcends finitude, so Eros is caught between 
(metaxu) finitude and the longing for the eternal and divine.56 
Although other examples of the pursuit of infinite wisdom 
may no doubt be identified in the works of Plato, it is the 
account of Aristotle that is of chief interest in what follows.
For example, in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle discusses the intellectual virtues, including the 
nature of wisdom (chapters 7-8). He suggests first that as 
the combination of insight (nous) and science (episteme), 
wisdom (sophia) must be, “the most finished of the forms of 
knowledge”.57 He further distinguishes prudence (phronesis) 
from wisdom proper (sophia).58 Whereas the former deals 
with action and what is of advantage to the human being, the 
latter offers no such advantage other than the knowledge 
derived from it’s exercise, noting in particular, that, “they 
53 For a larger discussion see, C.D.C Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The 
Argument of Plato’s Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
2006); also, Darrell Dobbs, “Plato’s Paragon of Human Excellence: Socratic 
Philosopher and Civic Guardian,” The Journal of Politics 65:4 (2003), 1062-
1082. Interestingly, according to Chroust, Aristotle in fact objected to Plato’s 
concept of the philosopher-ruler for the reason that, as Aristotle purportedly 
suggests, philosophers ought not to be kings, but rather advisors to kings. 
See, Anton-Hermann Chroust, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s “Philosopher 
King”,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Neue Folge, 111:1 (1968), 16-22.
54 Plato, Republic, 514a-520a. This is further confirmed by Socrates who 
earlier (508e) states that he cannot define the good but only the form of it.
55 Plato, Symposium, 203be. For further discussion of the link between 
Eros and philosophy, see Mark Holowchak, “Wisdom, Wine, and Wonder-
Lust in Plato’s Symposium,” Philosophy and Literature 27:2 (2003), 415-
427.
56 I am thinking here of Desmond’s concept of the between (metaxu). See, 
for example, William Desmond, Being and the Between (NY: State University 
of New York Press, 1995).
57 Aristotle, E.N., 1141a16-19. All translations for Aristotle’s texts are from 
Johnathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol 2, ed. by Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton University Press, 1984). For a general discussion of 
Aristotle’s account of Wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics, see, Chapter 9 of 
Carlo Natali, The Wisdom of Aristotle (NY: SUNY Press, 2001). 
58 (1141a25-30). I avoid the traditional division between ‘practical’ 
and ‘theoretical’ wisdom for the reason that the characterization tends to 
over-intellectualize the latter kind, which Aristotle also links to happiness 
or well-being. I therefore translate the Greek in a more literal sense, using 
‘prudence’ for phronesis and ‘wisdom’ for sophia.
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know things that are remarkable (peritta), admirable 
(thaumasta), difficult (chalepa), and divine (daimonia), but 
useless (achresta); viz., because it is not human goods that 
they seek.”59
In Book X, chapters 7-8, the account of wisdom is 
brought into alignment with the highest happiness or well-
being (eudaimonia) through the activity of contemplation 
(theoria).60 Contemplation is further described as the most 
excellent (kratiste), continuous (synechestate) or enduring 
(atryton), pleasant (hediste), self-sufficient (autarkes), 
and leisurely (scholastikon) of activities.61 He later links 
contemplation to the chief activity of the gods,62 and 
following this, in a significant passage which I quote in full, 
points out the limitations inherent in the human pursuit of 
infinite wisdom:
But such a life would be too high for man; for it is 
not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in 
so far as something divine is present in him; and by 
so much as this is superior to our composite nature 
is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of 
the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in 
comparison with man, the life according to it is divine 
in comparison with human life. But we must not 
follow those who advise us, being men, to think of 
human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, 
but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, 
and strain every nerve to live in accordance with 
the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, 
much more does it in power and worth surpass 
everything.63
Further elucidations of the nature of infinite wisdom are 
provided in the first two chapters of Book I (Alpha) of the 
Metaphysics, with specific emphasis placed upon analysis of 
the attributes of the sage.64 In chapter 1, Aristotle initiates with 
a general account of the axiological structure of knowledge. 
He suggests that although knowledge begins with experience 
and the particular, it is nonetheless completed in rational 
insight and the universal. A number of comparisons as well 






64 Although the account of wisdom in the Metaphysics is classically tied to 
the account of metaphysics as precisely the science of wisdom, I here omit 
discussion of this issue. Indeed, to enter into the complexities of this problem 
would draw us into larger historical issues regarding the (often disputed) 
unity of Aristotle’s text, not to mention the interconnections between 
metaphysics, theology, and the specialized sciences. Such a discussion I here 
set aside as a separate inquiry. 
contrast to the connected experience (empeiria) of animals 
versus the human being,65 and also, between those who live 
according to experience and the particular (kath’ hekaston) 
in contrast with those who live according to art (techne) and 
the universal (katholou).66 Again, as the manual laborer is to 
the master-craftsman (architekton), so the wise person is 
to the individual of experience. Whereas the former know 
the why (dioti) and cause (aition) for which they work, the 
latter do not, and act as if blindly and by habit (ethos).67 I call 
this last illustration, the analogy of the knowledge-architect: 
As the architect provides the blueprint according to which 
the manual laborers ‘blindly’ work, so too the knowledge-
architect discerns and provides the principles and causes 
that serve as assumptions for which the other sciences 
‘blindly’ labor. 
In chapter 2, Aristotle examines the nature of infinite 
wisdom. His account there likewise serves as a kind of 
synthesis of various points cited in the above passages and 
texts. I call this account the “classical paradigm” of infinite 
wisdom. It is the paradigm of philosophy as pursuing infinite 
wisdom according to the three attributes of the domain, 
dominion, and dignity of wisdom.68 In what follows, I offer 
a description of each attribute, providing textual evidence 
where relevant. 
First, there is the domain of wisdom. This attribute 
corresponds to the seemingly disparate but quite manifold 
skills of the sages earlier reported in Diogenes Laertius. 
Here, such skills are brought beneath a grand synthesis, 
that is called ‘wisdom’. Aristotle states that the domain of 
infinite wisdom is such that the sage will, “know all things 
(epistasthai panta), as far as possible”.69 The statement is, 
65 Aristotle, Met., 980b25-27. For a discussion of Aristotle’s account 
of wisdom in the Metaphysics, see Seth Bernardete, “On Wisdom and 
Philosophy: The First Two Chapters of Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” A,” The 
Review of Metaphysics 32:2 (1978), 205-215. 
66 Aristotle, Met., 981a15-18.
67 Aristotle, Met., 981a31-981b9.
68 As Aristotle’s works are appropriated in later medieval thought, so 
too the classical paradigm. See, especially, Thomas Machula, “Theology as 
Wisdom: Renaissance and Modern Scholastic Commentaries on Aquinas,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93:2 (2019), 211-225. Machula 
explicitly identifies (p. 213) the threefold paradigm (as here discussed) 
central to issues identified among the later commentators of Thomas 
Aquinas. I note that in medieval thought, the classical paradigm is in fact 
appropriated through the guise of Theology. For an account of the difference 
between the account of wisdom as understood in Aristotle and alternatively 
Aquinas, see Edmond Eh, “Wisdom in Aristotle and Aquinas: From 
Metaphysics to Mysticism,” Existenz 12:2 (2017), 19-24. Further distinctions 
regarding the difference between the Aristotelian account of wisdom and 
early medieval accounts (e.g., Augustine and Boethius) relative also to Neo-
Platonism can be seen in Heather M. Erb, “The Varieties of Wisdom and the 
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however, immediately qualified by the addition that such 
knowledge does not imply that the sage will know also all 
the particulars (kath’ hekaston) of things.70 To the contrary, 
the sage seeks to acquire a knowledge of the starting points 
of knowledge (see below). As all other knowledge advances 
on the basis of such starting points, to that extent, the sage 
therefore indirectly examines all things. Sage-knowledge is 
therefore generalist in nature, and likewise takes the form of 
a scientia universalis. 
Second, there is the dominion of wisdom. Here the 
wise utterances of the sages find their place. In a race, the 
runners begin at the starting line, and advance round the 
track to the finish line, which is incidentally the same place 
as the starting line. In like fashion, knowledge proceeds from 
starting points, and advances back towards such starting 
points.71 This expresses the nature of wisdom as proceeding 
from and to first principles (archai) and causes (aitiai), of 
which Aristotle notes, “the knowledge of which is wisdom 
(sophia)”.72 In this sense, wisdom encompasses what might 
be taken as the axioms of all that which can be known. Within 
a formally deductive system, for example, axioms serve 
as the basic starting points or assumptions from which all 
other conclusions are drawn. In analogous fashion, the first 
principles and causes examined by the sage serve as the 
starting points or axioms governing the several ancillary or 
specialized sciences. From this perspective, such wisdom 
and the wise become also instructive of the other disciplines. 
Aristotle thus notes that, “the wise man must not be ordered 
but must order”.73 Here the analogy of the knowledge-
architect comes again into play: Whereas wisdom labors for 
its own sake, the other sciences labor for the sake of wisdom. 
In consequence, wisdom is the most authoritative science, 
this serving as a further qualification of dominion.74
Third, there is the dignity of wisdom. Two points are 
here identified. The first involves the link between wisdom 
and the free exercise of inquiry. Echoing earlier remarks 
in the Nicomachean Ethics regarding both the inutility of 
wisdom as well as leisure, Aristotle states that wisdom is 
“desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing”.75 
Wisdom is further disassociated from productive science (ou 
poieteki) for the reason that the earliest philosophers (i.e., 
the sages) inquired out of wonder (thaumasantes) and in 







without any practical or utilitarian purpose (ou chreseos).76 
In this, a link may be drawn between Aristotle’s account and 
the earlier discussion of Socratic ignorance (“I know that I 
do not know”). It is in ignorance as well as perplexity at such 
ignorance that the search for wisdom commences. Finally, 
Aristotle draws an essential analogy that serves to highlight 
the dignity of wisdom, which is that one who pursues such 
wisdom is free in the highest degree and sense:
Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of 
any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, 
who exists for his own sake and not for another’s, so 
we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone 
exists for its own sake.77
The second point regards the dignity of the kinds of 
objects that wisdom examines. Among the starting points 
of knowledge, there are included the final causes (telos) of 
explanation such as the good (to agathon),78 which Aristotle 
notably characterizes in the Nicomachean Ethics as that 
which all things naturally desire.79 Again, wisdom examines 
not only the object of natural desire, but also divine matters, 
including the divine itself (o theos). In these two examples, 
the dignity of wisdom arises as an inquiry into certain kinds 
of objects that stand highest among all other things, first, as 
the aim of all human desire, and second, as the most splendid 
and marvelous object(s) of contemplation. 
Finally, Aristotle notes that, in the end, such heights of 
infinite wisdom may well lie beyond our finite capacities, 
being rather the possession of, “either god alone…or God 
above all others”.80 Of course, that the perfection of infinite 
wisdom is beyond us, does not imply that the human being 
cannot aspire to some approximation to it. To the contrary, 
we ought to seek such wisdom, and in doing so, may even 
achieve some degree of excellence (virtue) in its pursuit.
The Performance of Infinite Wisdom
Between the finite and the infinite stands an infinite 
gap. If the human being, as finite, pursues a wisdom that is 
infinite, then there seems to be no possibility of transcending 
the gap between the two. In comparison to the infinite, any 
positive finite number is next to nothing (e.g., n/∞ = 0, where 
n is a finite number). Nevertheless, a finite number differs 




80 Aristotle, Met., 983a10. See also Bryan C. Reece, “Aristotle on 
Divine and Human Contemplation,” Ergo 7:4 (2020). DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0007.004. Also, Chapter 3 of C.D.C. Reeve, 
Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (Harvard 
University Press, 2012).  
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from zero in being a positive finite quantity. In like fashion, 
even if the human attainment of wisdom is next to nothing 
in comparison with the divine, in itself, there is a certain 
excellence in one who achieves such gains. It is in this way 
that we might consider the pursuit of infinite wisdom as a 
virtue (arete) whose excellence may to some extent be finitely 
achieved. Of course, the finite individual who achieves such 
excellence, as already noted, does so finitely. But as the finite 
achievement is also an achievement relative to the pursuit 
of the infinite, it is also an achievement that to some extent 
transcends finitude. 
A simple analogy will help to explain my meaning here. 
Looking around in the room, a number of objects can be 
seen—a coffee mug, a cell phone, spectacles, a book. These 
objects lay within the range of my finite senses. I can reorder 
the objects in my mind, alter their colors, count them—
four. But what is truly spectacular in all of this is the human 
capacity to immediately leap beyond the limits of finitude. 
At one moment, I am reflecting upon a finite set of objects in 
the room. At another moment, my mind can lay hold of grand 
abstractions, infinite numbers, absurd and contradictory 
objects, ceaseless space, absolute nothingness, eternity, 
permanency, and perfection. With the ancients, we might say, 
that in such reflections the mind becomes like unto its object. 
If this is the case (if only metaphorically), then it follows that 
in such thoughts, the human mind in some sense extends 
beyond the limits of finitude. 
Earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle links wisdom 
to intellectual virtue.81 Intellectual virtue itself is a type of 
excellence. So the philosopher who pursues, and alternatively 
attains a certain degree of excellence in the pursuit of infinite 
wisdom, must inevitably exhibit such wisdom. But as such 
a philosopher qua sage is admittedly finite, to that extent, 
the exhibition of wisdom must itself be both finite and yet 
extending beyond finitude, insofar as it involves a reaching 
out into infinitude. For this reason, such an exhibition, which 
lies between the finite and the infinite, I call monumental. 
Alternatively, the sage who exhibits such wisdom, I call a 
monumental sage. 
Recognizing at least the possibility of such a sage, one is 
compelled to ask, have there ever been such sages? If so, then 
what would the performances of such monumental sages be? 
A possible response is now available to us. Aristotle’s account 
of wisdom serves precisely as the paradigm of infinite 
wisdom. In particular, Aristotle himself may be produced 
as an historical example of one who exhibits wisdom 
monumentally. Consider the following: It was Aristotle who 
first synthesized the scattered thoughts of his predecessors, 
putting together an early scientific vision that would inform 
81 Aristotle, E.N., 1103a1-5.
a multitude of generations for almost two millennia.82 
Although fundamentally incomplete, the Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic universe nonetheless had a predictive value that 
would serve as the backbone for later modern scientific 
advances.83 Still more, it was Aristotle who, if not being the 
first biologist, was at least the first to lay down the theoretical 
rigors of that science. He developed the first classification 
system, indeed, the very concept of such a system originated 
in his analyses of the nature of categorical sameness and 
difference.84 His many researchers conducted at the Lyceum 
are likewise still with us: Long scientific inquiries that show 
detailed collections and analyses of diverse species spanning 
plant to animal kingdom. It was Aristotle (e.g., the Posterior 
Analytics) who further conferred upon western civilization 
the first paradigm of what a science is and ought to consist 
in.85 He bequeathed upon civilization a formal structure for 
understanding causality. He developed the first formal rules 
of logic, the first philosophy of science, the first rigorous 
division of the sciences, and so on. He likewise developed 
a system of ethics, politics, aesthetics, poetics, rhetoric, 
dialectics, metaphysics—and all of this at the initial dawning 
of western intellectual thought.
To conclude, two points may be drawn from the above 
observations. First, although Aristotle’s intellectual capacities 
reached into the ability to fix his mind upon specialized 
forms of research (as instanced in his scientific works), he 
was far more than a specialist. Akin to the pre-Socratic sages, 
he was a generalist of the highest refinement (domain). Still 
more, he was a generalist who sought to synthesize human 
knowledge from the ground up (dominion), reaching out to 
the divine (dignity), and in a way that was averse to mere 
flights of fancy, but sought instead to remain ever consonant 
with the sciences of his time. His was a science and yet it 
was far more than science. It was a philosophy in pursuit of 
infinite wisdom. 
Second, the achievements of Aristotle were cultural 
achievements. Aristotle was the fruit, his predecessors the 
82 For an account of these early developments, see, G.E.R. Lloyd, Early 
Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974).
83 Indeed, the scientific contributions of Aristotle are still very much 
implicitly present within the natural sciences. See, e.g., Edward Feser, 
Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and 
Biological Science (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae, 2019).
84 See, e.g., Eleni Voultsiadou, et al., “Aristotle’s scientific contributions 
to the classification, nomenclature and distribution of marine organisms,” 
Mediterranean Marine Science 18:3 (2017): 468-478. See, e.g., Mariska 
Leunissan, Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
85 An interesting application of Aristotelianism in the modeling of 
modern scientific concepts can be seen in William A. Wallace, The Modelling 
of Nature: Philosophy of Science and the Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis 
(The Catholic University Press, 1996).
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seed and soil. Aristotle stood upon the shoulders of other 
giants—Plato, Socrates, the pre-Socratic sages, Egyptian 
and Persian influences, and so on. Yet he likewise strode 
far above and beyond them. The time was ripe for wisdom, 
and Aristotle was among the greatest intellectual fruits that 
flowered forth from the Golden Age of Greece. In his work we 
see a creative genius that both uncovered and systematized 
the ancient worldview. In Aristotle, we see not one or two 
achievements, but a multitude of achievements; and we see 
such achievements not in one or two or even three distinct 
fields of inquiry, but again, in a multitude of such fields—
from physics to biology to logic to metaphysics to aesthetics 
to ethics to political science. So even Dante recognized his 
achievements in the Divine Comedy:
When I had lifted up my brows a little,
The Master I beheld of those who know,
Sit with his philosophic family.86
86 Dante, Inferno, 4.130-132, translated by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. 
Retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1001/1001-h/1001-h.
htm.
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